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ABSTRACT 
 
Every day, we make a series of tradeoffs between privacy and 
convenience. We may check our email, post on social media, use the 
free Wi-Fi in public spaces, or take our cellphones with us wherever 
we go without a clear understanding of what information we are 
giving away when we do so. Increasingly, we are seeing products 
that claim to defy this opaqueness associated with big data and put 
users at the helm of their information. These “featurized” products 
wrap themselves in a data empowerment narrative, but ultimately 
erode individual privacy in new ways, sometimes even capitalizing 
on it. This article seeks to explore the concept of featurization 
further—where it came from, what it is, and how featurized products 
are currently being regulated. The article will end by proposing 
some recommendations for balancing the innovation that 
featurization can bring while ensuring individuals’ privacy rights 
are adequately protected. 
 
                                                 
*A huge thank you to Professor Anupam Chander for all of his help and 
guidance in writing this article, and to all of the Washington Journal of Law, 
Technology & Arts editors for their instrumental help in getting this work 
published. This Article does not represent the views of the organization with 
which the author is affiliated.   
1
Lalji: Featurization and the Myth of Data Empowerment
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2019
2 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 15:1 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction ......................................................................................2 
I. Featurization in Context ...............................................................5 
A. Primary Featurization ..........................................................7 
1. Ovulation and Menstrual Trackers .............................8 
2. Health Diagnostic Apps .............................................9 
3. Genetic Testing Kits .................................................11 
SAMPLE 23ANDME HEALTH REPORT ...............................11 
4. Finance Industry .......................................................11 
B. Secondary Featurization .....................................................13 
II. Existing Privacy and Security Protections ................................17 
A. Sectoral U.S. Privacy Laws ...............................................17 
B. FTC Enforcement ...............................................................18 
C. California Consumer Privacy Act ......................................20 
D. General Data Protection Regulation ..................................22 
III. Concerns under Existing Law ..................................................23 
A. Increased Vulnerability to Data Breaches .........................25 
B. Expanding the Scope of Permissible Surveillance .............27 
C. Discrimination and Economic Loss ...................................29 
D. Impact on Vulnerable Communities ..................................31 
IV. Recommendations....................................................................32 
A. Create Statutory Limitations on the Third-Party Doctrine 32 
B. Increase Oversight into Products in Sensitive Industries ...33 
1. Security .....................................................................33 
2. Fairness .....................................................................34 
3. Accuracy ...................................................................34 
Conclusion .....................................................................................35 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“It’s not a bug, it’s a feature.” The pithy catchphrase coined by 
programmers to reframe mechanical defects as intentional and 
desirable1 also deftly defines the transition from big data’s scary 
opacity to a new era of transparency and access. What was once a 
bug—the unknowable and seemingly unending troves of data that 
                                                 
1 Nicholas Carr, ‘It’s Not a Bug, It’s a Feature.’ Trite—or Just Right?, WIRED 
(Aug. 19, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/its-not-a-bug-its-a-feature/.   
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companies have collected about us—is now its feature, by making 
users’ data trails visible, accessible, and interactive. This 
“featurization” of data has been characterized as the antidote to big 
data’s shadowy tendencies—a way to bring companies’ data 
collection and use practices into the sunlight, and provide 
individuals with tangible value.2 It refers both to the new products 
that allow individuals to track and analyze their own data, and the 
secondary features provided as a quid pro quo for data collection.  
Several companies across many different sectors offer featurized 
products. Genetic companies like 23andMe offer individual reports 
on ancestry and genetic health risks.3 Financial planning apps like 
Mint help users create budgets and remind them to pay their bills on 
time.4 Smart thermometers like Nest provide users with information 
about their daily movements and routines in addition to helping 
them save money on their utility bills.5 Period tracking apps like Flo 
and Ovia provide women with insight into their menstrual health 
and help them plan and track their pregnancies.6 All of these 
applications purport to empower individuals by enabling them to 
gain personal knowledge through data collection and achieve 
individual goals. 
However, while the marketing of these products provides a small 
window into companies’ data use practices, they also obscure how 
individuals’ data can be used in ways that are adverse to their 
interests. Moreover, these behind-the-scenes practices are often 
enhanced by the interactive and accessible features these companies 
offer. 23andMe, for example, recently sold the exclusive rights to 
search through their customer data for drug targets to 
                                                 
2 See Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User 
Control in the Age of Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 242-43 
(2013). 
3 Compare Our DNA Tests, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/compare-
dna-tests/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2019). 
4 Bill Tracking: Online Monthly Bill Tracking & Reminders, MINT, 
https://www.mint.com/how-mint-works/bills#toc (last visited Apr. 26, 2019).  
5 Overview, NEST, https://nest.com/thermostats/nest-learning-
thermostat/overview/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2019). 
6 See, e.g., Tehrene Firman & Samantha Lefave, The Best Period Tracker 
Apps that Belong on Your Phone, REDBOOK (July 31, 2018),  
https://www.redbookmag.com/body/g19091742/best-period-tracker-apps/. 
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pharmaceutical company GlaxoSmithKline.7 Likewise, period-
tracker apps have come under fire for sharing users’ personal 
information with advertisers and other third parties.8  
The data collected by these products, particularly in sensitive 
industries such as finance and health, may harm individuals in 
several key respects, including discrimination, economic loss, and 
increased vulnerability to data breaches. These practices also create 
large databases of extremely personal information that law 
enforcement may be able to access without ever having to notify 
affected individuals.9 Additionally, by providing direct-to-consumer 
services, companies may be able to skirt the more stringent sectoral 
privacy laws because they do not fall under the traditional 
conception of a covered entity.10  
This paper will explore the current era of big data: the countless 
products that encourage individuals to engage with data about 
themselves and how that interaction leads to harms that manifest 
themselves over the long term. Although much has been written 
about the privacy and security concerns related to the Internet of 
Things, as well as data tracking products in particular industries, 
there is currently limited literature on the harms both unique to and 
exacerbated by featurization. Part I of this article will provide the 
reader with a framework for thinking about featurization and its 
benefits. Part II will summarize the state of consumer privacy laws 
                                                 
7 See Megan Molteni, 23andMe’s Pharma Deals Have Been the Plan All 
Along, WIRED (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/23andme-
glaxosmithkline- pharma-deal//. 
8 See Sarah Burke, Your Menstrual App Is Probably Selling Data About Your 
Body, VICE (May 11, 2018), 
https://broadly.vice.com/en_us/article/8xe4yz/menstrual-app-period-tracker-
data-cyber-security. 
9 See, e.g., Salvador Hernandez, One of the Biggest At-Home DNA Testing 
Companies Is Working with the FBI, BUZZFEED NEWS (Jan. 31, 2019), 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/salvadorhernandez/family-tree-dna-fbi-
investigative-genealogy-privacy; Russell Brandom, Why Facebook is Beating the 
FBI at Facial Recognition, THE VERGE (July 7, 2014), 
https://www.theverge.com/2014/7/7/5878069/why-facebook-is-beating-the-fbi-
at-facial-recognition.  
10 See, e.g., Katherine Drabiak, Caveat Emptor: How the Intersection of Big 
Data and Consumer Genomics Exponentially Increases Informational Privacy 
Risks, 27 HEALTH MATRIX 143, 160 (2017). 
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in the United States. Part III will assess the harms that featurization 
poses and analyze whether existing privacy laws at the federal or 
state level offer any meaningful protections. Finally, Part IV of this 
article will offer suggestions on how to maintain value and utility 
while providing baseline privacy and security protections. 
  
I. FEATURIZATION IN CONTEXT 
 
In 2012, a man stormed into a Minneapolis Target to complain 
that the store was mailing coupons for baby and maternity items to 
his daughter.11 He found it inappropriate that the store was mailing 
her these advertisements while she was still in high school. Target, 
however, had just predicted the pregnancy before his daughter had 
let the family know. This story became infamous for representing 
how companies’ use of big data can quickly cross privacy 
boundaries12—and Target is not the only company to have 
committed a big data faux pas.13  
As more stories emerged highlighting the negative 
consequences of big data, public perception of private data 
collection shifted.14 By 2014, 91% of adults agreed or strongly 
agreed that consumers no longer had control over how companies 
used or collected their personal information, while 64% believed the 
                                                 
11 Kashmir Hill, How Target Figured Out a Teen Girl Was Pregnant Before 
Her Father Did, FORBES (Feb. 16, 2012), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/02/16/how-target-figured-out-a-
teen-girl-was-pregnant-before-her-father-did/#12cc321c6668.  
12 See Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 16, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-
habits.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&hp.  
13 See, e.g., Ben Goldacre, When Data Gets Creepy: the Secrets We Don’t 
Realise We’re Giving Away, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 5, 2014), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/dec/05/when-data-gets-creepy-
secrets-were-giving-away.  
14 See, e.g., MARY MADDEN, PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF PRIVACY AND 
SECURITY IN THE POST-SNOWDEN ERA 1-2 (2014), 
https://www.pewinternet.org/2014/11/12/public-privacy-perceptions/; Maggie 
McGrath, Target Data Breach Spilled Info on As Many As 70 Million Customers, 
FORBES (Jan. 10, 2014), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/maggiemcgrath/2014/01/10/target-data-breach-
spilled-info-on-as-many-as-70-million-customers/#104d23c8e795.  
5
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government should do more to regulate advertisers.15 Moreover, the 
survey indicated that people wanted more of a say as to how their 
data was being used; 93% said that being in control of who may 
access information about them was “very important.”16  
The concept of featurization was born out of the growing 
disenchantment with big data. It was first proposed as a way to 
subvert the opacity of companies’ data collection practices, by 
making data a “consumer-side feature of products and services.”17 
Simply put, featurization creates an intentional link between 
consumers’ data and companies’ data collection and processing 
practices by returning some of that value to the consumer. Think of 
an ancestry composition report by 23andMe, which distills an 
individual’s heritage into neat and distinct categories, or, the Nest 
Learning Thermostat, which provides a breakdown of users’ 
household activity habits; both of these products prominently 
display the data they are collecting from users and offer them insight 
they may have otherwise been unable to identify. These types of 
products and services are now widely available across various 
sectors—from medicine to social media.  
The problem with featurization, however, is that it merely 
provides a window into the data a product collects rather than the 
full picture. Under the typical featurization paradigm, users are only 
privy to some of the data collected and only some of the ways the 
data may actually be used. In this way, access has been falsely 
equated with full transparency. For example, although Nest allows 
users to see the data collected about them through user activity 
reports, Nest had not initially been so forthright about whether its 
user data would be combined with Google’s, once it had been 
                                                 
15 Madden, supra note 14, at 30. 
16 Mary Madden & Lee Rainie, Americans’ Attitudes About Privacy, Security 
and Surveillance, PEW RES. CTR. (May 20, 2015), 
https://www.pewinternet.org/2015/05/20/americans-attitudes-about-privacy-
security-and-surveillance/. 
17 The term “featurization” was first coined by Omer Tene and Jules 
Polonetsky in their seminal piece, Big Data for All. This process, Tene and 
Polonetsky suggest, should be offered up as a “quid pro quo for looser data 
collection and minimization restrictions.” See Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 2, 
at 263-64.  
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acquired.18 Similarly, while 23andMe extols the types of 
information it can make available to users about their DNA, it may 
bury how long it will keep users’ data, or what it might do with the 
data afterwards, even after a user requests its deletion, in the middle 
of the privacy policy.19 Featurization thus exacerbates some of the 
harms already posed by big data, and, in certain cases, creates new 
ones.  
This section will break up products that “featurize” data into two 
types: those that function through self-surveillance, and those that 
provide users access to their data as a secondary benefit, and offer 
some examples in each category. Then, it will assess how the 
differences might play out under existing laws and regulations.  
 
A.  Primary Featurization 
 
Primary featurization is quintessentially about self-surveillance. 
The express purpose of primary featurization products is to process 
and featurize users’ data; thus, the trade-off between privacy and 
insight is made apparent from the beginning of the user’s 
relationship with the product.20 More strongly put, these products 
are predicated on lessened privacy interests in return for the value 
these products purport to offer. Users are subsequently comfortable 
allowing themselves to be surveilled to a certain degree in order to 
obtain the benefits that the product offers.  
The healthcare industry is saturated with primary featurization 
products. The abundance of these products can be traced, in part, to 
the popularity of the “quantified self” movement, which promotes 
tracking health-related data about oneself as a means to further one’s 
mental, physical, and emotional health.21 Consequently, the 
                                                 
18 Casey Johnston, What Google Can Really Do with Nest, or Really, Nest’s 
Data, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 15, 2014), https://arstechnica.com/information-
technology/2014/01/what-google-can-really-do-with-nest-or-really-nests-data/.  
19 See, e.g., Peter Pitts, The Privacy Delusions of Genetic Testing, FORBES 
(Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2017/02/15/the-privacy-
delusions-of-genetic-testing/#898eb721bba5. 
20 See Kang et al., Self-Surveillance Privacy, 97 IOWA L. REV. 809, 813-15 
(2012). 
21 Although the movement began in the 1970s, the term was coined by two 
Wired Magazine editors, Gary Wolf and Kevin Kelly, in 2007. The movement 
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innumerable products that featurize health-related data include 
personal genomics testing; diagnostic apps; and fitness, diet, and 
menstrual trackers, that monitor everything from heart rate, calories 
burned, number of steps, body temperature, quality and length of 
sleep, menstrual cycles, and emotional patterns. To highlight the 
types of sensitive personal information these types of products 
collect, some examples are described in more detail below.22  
 
1. Ovulation and Menstrual Trackers 
 
Ovulation and menstrual trackers are part of a growing industry 
referred to as “Femtech,” which is meant to use technology to 
“improve women’s health.”23 They are typically mobile phone 
applications that operate by asking users to provide various 
information about their menstrual history and health, and prompt 
data collection by telling users that the more information they 
provide, the more accurate their results will be. These trackers, such 
as Ovia or Flo, not only track when a woman’s period occurs, but 
also the emotional and physical symptoms that occur over the course 
of their cycle. In order to do so, the apps ask women to input 
information about their symptoms and activities. Flo, for example, 
asks users to input the nature of their menstrual flow, sex drive and 
sexual history, mood, stress level, physical symptoms, and alcohol 
consumption, among other things. Users are not just asked to 
provide this information during menstruation, but every day. 
Although inputting this information is not necessary for the app to 
                                                 
espouses the idea of the “quantified self” as a means to use data to help improve 
daily life, e.g., by helping with sleep, diet, and other medical problems. See 
Rachael Rettner, The Quantified Self: How Data-Obsessed Trackers Push Toward 
Healthier Lives, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 8, 2014), 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/quantified-self-health-data-
tracking_n_5111958?ncid=fcbklnkushpmg00000043&ir=Science.   
22 For a more extensive list of mobile health apps, and the risks they may 
pose, see Healgorithms: Understanding the Potential for Bias in mHealth Apps, 
CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Sept. 13, 2018), 
https://cdt.org/insight/healgorithms-understanding-the-potential-for-bias-in-
mhealth-apps/.  
23 Kate Clark, It’s a New Era for Fertility Tech, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 28, 
2019), https://techcrunch.com/2019/02/28/its-a-new-era-for-fertility-tech/. 
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predict users’ cycle dates, the app suggests that logging symptoms 
will improve their cycle predictions. 
   
 
SCREENSHOTS OF FLO24 
 
2. Health Diagnostic Apps 
 
Health diagnostic apps prompt users to provide their symptoms 
and then offer medical solutions based on the information provided. 
These apps vary significantly from one another in approach and user 
experience. WebMD’s symptom checker, for example, simply asks 
users for a series of inputs in a standardized format, then displays a 
list of conditions that match those symptoms. Other health 
diagnostic apps enable users to submit photos along with other 
                                                 
24 Erin Migdol, 9 Apps That Can Help People with Chronic Illnesses Track 
Their Periods, THE MIGHTY (Feb. 16, 2018) (image excerpted above), 
https://themighty.com/2018/02/period-tracking-apps-endometriosis-chronic-
illness/. 
9
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inputs about their symptoms.25 Still others use artificial intelligence 
(AI) to simulate the experience of speaking with a doctor. The 
“health companion” mobile app Ada, for example, asks a series of 
questions in a back-and-forth exchange that mimics texting with 
another person.26 Once the app identifies a potential condition, it 
allows users to save it to their account and helps them connect with 
a doctor, pharmacist, or other specialist, if necessary. The Ada app 
also enables users to specify whether they are trying to obtain a 
diagnosis for themselves or for a friend. Another health app, 
Miiskin, helps users keep track of skin spots for early detection of 
melanoma.27 Users can upload photos of their skin to the app, which 
helps them compare any skin changes over time.28   
 
 
SCREENSHOT OF MIISKIN APP29 
                                                 
25 What We Do and Who We Are, MIISKIN https://miiskin.com/about/ (last 
visited Apr. 23, 2019); Healgorithms: Understanding the Potential for Bias in 
mHealth Apps, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Sept. 13, 2018), 
https://cdt.org/insight/healgorithms-understanding-the-potential-for-bias-in-
mhealth-apps/. 
26 About Us, ADA, https://ada.com/about/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2019). 
27 About Miiskin, MIISKIN, https://miiskin.com/app/ (last visited Apr. 23, 
2019). 
28 Id.  
29 Explore the Miiskin App, MIISKIN (image excerpted above), 
https://miiskin.com/app/ (Apr. 23, 2019). 
10
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol15/iss1/2
2019]  FEATURIZATION AND THE MYTH OF DATA EMPOWERMENT 11 
3. Genetic Testing Kits 
 
Direct-to-consumer genetic testing companies like 23andMe 
have generated a market for at-home DNA testing, promising 
consumers a means to discover information about their heritage, 
health, and genetic traits. Typically, users send the company a 
sample of their DNA and receive a report in a few weeks. These 
reports can provide a variety of information, including an ethnicity 
breakdown, potential relatives, predispositions towards certain 
health conditions, genetic traits, carrier status for various diseases 
and genetic disorders, and overall wellness information. 
     
 
SAMPLE 23ANDME HEALTH REPORT30 
 
4. Finance Industry 
 
Outside of the healthcare industry, there are also many products 
that featurize financial data. Most of these apps are designed to assist 
with money management, although the types of information they 
                                                 
30 23AndMe Ancestry DNA Test Review: A 10-Minute Deep Dive (2019 
Update), MY FAMILY DNA TEST (image excerpted above), 
https://www.myfamilydnatest.com/23andme-review/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2019). 
11
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require, and the sophistication of the services they offer, vary 
significantly. For example, the mobile app Trim claims it will be 
able to save users money by negotiating down their bills and 
analyzing their transactions.31 The Albert app provides investment 
and savings advice, helps users develop a budget and financial plan, 
and alerts users when their bills and subscriptions increase. Albert 
also enables users to engage with it in a text-based format, in order 
to reach live financial assistants for advice. 
  
 
SAMPLE DIALOG WITH ALBERT GENIUS32 
 
Most of these apps require the user to link their bank account, 
and some require users to also provide the login information for their 
various subscriptions.  
                                                 
31 TRIM, https://www.asktrim.com (last visited Apr. 23, 2019). 
32 ALBERT (image excerpted above), https://albert.com/ (last visited Apr. 26, 
2019).  
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These products are marketed in a way that capitalizes on the 
mentality of the “quantified self” movement—that more 
information and more revelations make life better. For example, 
23andMe’s homepage states, “Commit to a healthier you, inspired 
by your genes—with 125+ genetic reports”33; Fitbit’s homepage 
includes the remarks: “Fitbit motivates you to reach your health and 
fitness goals by tracking your activity, exercise, sleep, weight and 
more”34; Ovia Health, the creator of several fertility and planning 
apps, states, “We help women and families navigate their most 
important moments with personalized and data-driven solutions for 
fertility, pregnancy, and parenting.”35 Finally, Mint’s tagline to 
consumers is, “We help you effortlessly manage your finances in 
one place.”36 Primary featurization products are thus marketed on 
the basis that they provide convenience, insight, and savings to the 
consumer—that they essentially exist to make consumers’ lives 
easier. However, as Part III will discuss, this obscures the privacy 
and security harms these types of products pose to consumers. 
 
B.  Secondary Featurization 
 
Secondary featurization differs from primary featurization in 
that the product’s functionality is not predicated upon user data 
collection, and, therefore, users may choose not to purchase or use 
the product on the basis of the value that the data collection process 
offers.37 However, as demonstrated with Facebook, users may still 
engage with that particular feature of the product or acquiesce to that 
type of data collection as a result of the way the process is marketed. 
                                                 
33 See Health + Ancestry, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/?myg=1 
(last visited Apr. 24, 2019).  
34 See FITBIT, https://www.fitbit.com/home (last visited Apr. 24, 2019).   
35 See OVIA HEALTH, https://www.oviahealth.com/ (last visited Apr. 24, 
2019). 
36 See MINT, https://www.mint.com/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2019). 
37 Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 2, at 263-64 (describing quid pro quo 
featurization in which consumers are likely to be more willing to share 
information if organizations also provide access to that personal data in formats 
that can be useful with other third party applications). 
13
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Moreover, many of the privacy concerns remain the same as with 
primary featurization.38  
Nest’s Learning Thermostat is one such example of secondary 
featurization. Nest’s Learning Thermostat primarily functions as a 
“smart thermometer,” meaning that it learns users’ energy habits to 
help regulate temperature in a way that saves them money, and 
offers the added convenience of being able to be set remotely. Nest 
also provides users with insight into “their own data trail” by 
allowing them to see what information it has gleaned about a user’s 
daily routine.39 While this feature does provide users with valuable 
information, it is also another way for Nest to collect information 
about them in a way that is only very loosely connected to its stated 
purpose.40 Perhaps this subterfuge makes users more amenable to 
the fact that these “smart thermometers” are actually using motion 
sensors to track movements throughout the household.41  
Another, and perhaps the most quintessential example of 
secondary featurization, comes from Facebook, the social media 
website that has been growing and adapting since it was first 
launched in 2004.42 One of Facebook’s first forays into featurization 
was the creation of its News Feed, which curates posts generated by 
users to be displayed in an algorithmically-determined order.43 
Facebook reportedly conceptualized the News Feed as a 
“personalized list of stories” based on “the latest headlines 
generated by the activity of your friends and social groups,” to 
combat the chaos and clutter of its Live Feed and provide users with 
a way to easily see the most relevant updates.44 Although the change 
                                                 
38 Infra Part III.  
39 See Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 2, at 265. 
40 Id. 
41 See Privacy Statement for Nest Products and Services, NEST 
https://nest.com/legal/privacy-statement-for-nest-products-and-services/ (last 
visited Apr. 29, 2019).  
42 Sarah Phillips, A Brief History of Facebook, THE GUARDIAN (July 15, 
2007), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2007/jul/25/media.newmedia. 
43 Josh Constine, How Facebook News Feed Works, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 6, 
2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/09/06/ultimate-guide-to-the-news-feed/.  
44 Samantha Murphy, The Evolution of Facebook News Feed, MASHABLE 
(Mar. 12, 2013), https://mashable.com/2013/03/12/facebook-news-feed-
evolution/#IoSYn_ZKLPq0. 
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initially incurred protests and privacy concerns, it quickly became 
an integral part of Facebook’s interface.45 
Nearly ten years later, Facebook revealed its data scientists had 
been manipulating the News Feeds of hundreds of thousands of 
users in order to conduct a psychological study assessing “how 
emotions can be spread on social media.”46 They did this by 
randomly selecting users and changing the number of positive or 
negative posts they saw.47 Notably, an analyst commented that 
“Facebook didn’t do anything illegal, but they didn’t do right by 
their customers.”48 Although Facebook ended that experiment with 
an apology, they subsequently manipulated News Feeds in another 
way: by removing professional news posts.49 That move was also 
met with significant criticism, including commentary that Facebook 
was “increasing fake news and misinformation on the platform.”50  
Facebook’s News Feed is just one of many features offered to 
its users that enabled the company to obtain more information about 
individuals, and to propel data usages not initially intended nor 
made publicly clear. In 2010, Facebook also rolled out a photo-
tagging feature that suggested the names of individuals in each 
photo, purportedly to save time when uploading photos.51 According 
to some advocacy groups, the company did not adequately explain 
to users, however, that by providing identifying information—the 
                                                 
45 Mercedes Bunz, Facebook Users Protest Over News Feed, THE GUARDIAN 
(Oct. 27, 2009), https://www.theguardian.com/media/pda/2009/oct/27/new-
facebook-newsfeed-protest. 
46 Vindu Goel, Facebook Tinkers with Users’ Emotions in News Feed 
Experiment, Stirring Outcry, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/30/technology/facebook-tinkers-with-users-
emotions-in-news-feed-experiment-stirring-outcry.html. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Alex Hern, Facebook Moving Non-Promoted Posts Out of News Feed in 
Trial, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 23, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/oct/23/facebook-non-promoted-
posts-news-feed-new-trial-publishers.  
50 Julia Carrie Wong, Facebook Ending News Feed Experiment Condemned 
as ‘Orwellian’, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 1, 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/01/facebook-news-feed-
experiment-media-posts.  
51 Murphy, supra note 44. 
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“tag”—to their photos, users were actually honing the company’s 
facial recognition technology.52 Meanwhile, as each new feature 
was introduced, all in the name of the consumer, Facebook slowly 
began to pull back on the privacy protections it offered.53 
 
SCREENSHOT OF FACEBOOK PHOTO TAGGING FEATURE54 
 
With featurization, the collection and use of data often begins as 
a way to add value for consumers. Yet, there remains no protection 
against repurposing that data, even if it happens years later. 
Moreover, as discussed in the following part, users often lack 
                                                 
52 Complaint In re Facebook, Inc. and Facial Recognition,  (filed Apr. 6, 
2018), https://www.epic.org/privacy/facebook/FTC-Facebook-FR-Complaint-
04062018.pdf.  
53 Kurt Opsahl, Facebook’s Eroding Privacy Policy: A Timeline, ELEC. 
FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 28, 2010), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/04/facebook-timeline.  
54 Ben Parr, Facebook brings facial recognition to photo tagging, CNN (Dec. 
16, 2010) (image excerpted above), 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/TECH/social.media/12/16/facebook.facial.recognitio
n.mashable/index.html. 
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adequate remedies if they are unhappy with the privacy concerns 
that manifest later.  
 
II. EXISTING PRIVACY AND SECURITY PROTECTIONS 
 
Currently, the United States does not have a comprehensive 
federal law governing privacy. Rather, privacy laws and regulations 
in the United States are broken up into two main branches.55 First 
are the several sectoral privacy laws that govern more sensitive areas 
of information including healthcare, finance credit information, and 
information relating to children.56 The second branch comes from 
the Federal Trade Commission’s enforcement authority under 
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”).57  
Certain other laws, like California’s recently passed California 
Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”) and the EU’s General Data 
Protection Regulation (“GDPR”), also apply to many U.S. 
companies.58 Each of these laws is discussed in more detail below.  
 
A.  Sectoral U.S. Privacy Laws 
 
Sectoral privacy laws are limited in scope. They only protect 
certain types of information, under certain circumstances. The 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”), for example, protects 
financial information, but only applies to “financial institutions” that 
engage in activities such as lending or exchanging money, providing 
loans, or collecting debts.59 Similarly, The Health Insurance 
                                                 
55 See Nuala O’Connor, Reforming the U.S. Approach to Data Protection and 
Privacy, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 30, 2018), 
https://www.cfr.org/report/reforming-us-approach-data-protection. 
56 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 6502 (West 
2019); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 45 C.F.R. § 164.105 
(2019); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 6801 (West 2019); Fair Credit 
Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681 (2019). 
57 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006). 
58 California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100 
(West 2019) (effective Jan. 1, 2020); Council Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 
119) 1, 5 (EU) [hereinafter GDPR]. 
59 16 C.F.R. § 313.1 (2019); How to Comply with the Privacy of Consumer 
Financial Information Rule of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, FTC (July 2002), 
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Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) only applies to 
“covered entities,” which include healthcare providers such as 
doctors and pharmacists, health plans, health clearinghouses, and 
the business associates of these entities.60 Consequently, companies 
that provide at-home DNA testing kits would not be regulated by 
HIPAA, nor would most mobile medical apps. As a result, even 
though these apps may collect information that is equally as 
sensitive as the type of information individuals may share with their 
doctor, these companies are not subject to heightened regulations 
governing how they may use or share that data.61 
  
B.  FTC Enforcement 
 
The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) is the primary regulator 
of U.S. privacy law.62 Although the FTC’s enforcement authority is 
broader and could extend to the companies that create and sell 
products that featurize data, it is limited in other respects. Rather 
than regulate affirmative privacy requirements under Section 5 of 
the FTCA, the FTC regulates against “unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices” affecting commerce.63 In that sense, rather than propagate 
general privacy requirements, the FTC must look at business 
practices individually to determine whether they are unfair or 
deceptive. While this enables the FTC to respond to new threats to 
data privacy and security as they emerge, those concepts are difficult 
to define in the context of featurization.  
The FTC primarily regulates privacy violations under the 
“deceptive” prong of its authority precisely because unfairness is a 
                                                 
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/how-comply-privacy-
consumer-financial-information-rule-gramm#whois.  
60 See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2014).  
61 See, e.g., Drabiak, supra note 10 at 146. 
62 See Press Release, FTC, FTC Releases 2018 Privacy and Data Security 
Update, (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2019/03/ftc-releases-2018-privacy-data-security-update.  
63 Robert Gellman, Can Consumers Trust the FTC to Protect Their Privacy?, 
ACLU (Oct. 25, 2016), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/internet-
privacy/can-consumers-trust-ftc-protect-their-privacy. 
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slippery term.64 But, the harms of featurization may not be 
considered a “deceptive practice” because this usually requires that 
a company violated an explicit promise it made, such as in its 
privacy policy.65 In most cases of harm posed by featurization, the 
privacy policy enumerates the ways in which individuals’ data 
might be used; it may just not be facially apparent. In addition, 
companies may write vague policies to avoid FTC scrutiny or 
modify their policies as they discover more uses for the data.66 
Because of this, there may be “little the FTC can do.”67  
Moreover, the FTC’s primary way of penalizing a company that 
has engaged in an unfair or deceptive practice is to issue a consent 
decree.68 This typically requires the offending company to 
implement certain privacy and security programs and subjects them 
to twenty years of FTC oversight.69 However, for bigger and more 
profitable companies, the FTC’s bark may still be worse than its 
bite.70 Facebook, for example, has been subject to a consent decree 
for nearly ten years, though recent news about the company suggests 
that the decree has had little impact.71 The FTC has developed 
important privacy requirements over time through its enforcement 
authority.72 However, without more affirmative enforcement 
authority, the FTC alone will not be able to mitigate these concerns. 
                                                 
64 Joseph Jerome, Can FTC Consent Orders Effectively Police Privacy?, 
INT’L. ASS’N OF PRIVACY PROF.  (Nov. 27, 2018), https://iapp.org/news/a/can-ftc-
consent-orders-police-privacy/ (a “showing of injury [is] not easily met in privacy 
disputes”). 
65 Gellman, supra note 63. 
66 Id. 
67 Id.  
68 See Jerome, supra note 64. 
69 Id. 
70 Id.; see also Nitasha Tiku, Why Facebook’s 2011 Promises Haven’t 
Protected Users, WIRED (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/why-
facebooks-2011-promises-havent-protected-users/.  
71 See Jerome, supra note 64, (“But as the FTC’s oversight of Facebook 
reaches its midpoint, there is growing evidence that these orders simply create 
box-checking exercises without protecting anyone’s privacy.”).  
72 See, e.g., Press Release, FTC, FTC’s $5 billion Facebook settlement: 
Record-breaking and history-making (July 24, 2019)  https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/blogs/business-blog/2019/07/ftcs-5-billion-facebook-settlement-record-
breaking-history. 
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Increasingly, the FTC is using its “unfairness” authority to 
regulate data security measures.73 When addressing unfairness, the 
FTC considers three factors: (1) whether the practice, even if not 
unlawful, offends public policy; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, 
oppressive, or unscrupulous; and (3) whether it causes substantial 
injury to consumers.74 For data security practices, this means the 
FTC requires that companies engage in encryption protocols 
compatible with industry standards and factor in the risk of security 
breaches when making decisions about how to store their users’ 
data.75 However, this may not be adequate to protect against data 
breaches of featurized data—both because this type of data, which 
is provided directly by the user, may be extraordinarily sensitive, 
and because the FTC’s practice of penalizing companies after the 
harm has occurred may not be sufficient to protect against future 
breaches by developing standards to protect against future harms as 
technology advances.76  
 
C.  California Consumer Privacy Act  
 
The CCPA offers new privacy protections for California 
residents and imposes additional requirements on larger companies 
that collect users’ personal information.77 In particular, the CCPA’s 
purpose limitation requirement and rights of access and deletion all 
offer some protections for data collected through featurization.78 
However, the CCPA may not be sufficient to protect against all 
types of harms caused by featurization.  
                                                 
73 See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 243 (3d Cir. 2015). 
74 Id. 
75 See Patricia Bailin, Study: What FTC Enforcement Actions Teach Us About 
the Features of Reasonable Privacy and Data Security Practices, INT’L. ASSOC. 
OF PRIVACY PROF.. (Sept. 19, 2014), 
https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/FTC-WhitePaper_V4.pdf.  
76 See, e.g., Adam Mazmanian, Senate Bill Would Give FTC New Data 
Breach Authority, FED. COMPUTER WK. (Jan. 10, 2018), 
https://fcw.com/articles/2018/01/10/ftc-data-breach-mazmanian.aspx.  
77 California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100 
(West 2019) (effective Jan. 1, 2020).  
78 Id. 
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The CCPA requires companies to provide individuals with 
information regarding the categories of personal information a 
company collects, as well as the purposes for which that information 
will be used.79 In addition, individuals may request information on 
the categories of personal information that is collected and the 
company’s purposes for collecting or selling it.80 Such disclosures 
could help individuals understand how their data is being used if the 
information is provided to them in an easily understandable format. 
Nonetheless, this right to request information does not prevent the 
types of adverse uses featurization implicates and would only 
require disclosure after the fact.  
The CCPA also imposes certain purpose limitation 
requirements.81 Under the law, businesses may not use collected 
information “for additional purposes without providing the 
consumer with notice and consent.”82 The CCPA also prohibits 
companies from collecting, selling, or using personal information 
“except as necessary to perform the business purpose.”83 
Additionally, in the event of a merger under the CCPA, covered 
companies must provide users with the right to opt out if the “third 
party materially alters how it uses or shares the personal information 
of a consumer in a manner that is materially inconsistent with the 
promises made at the time of collection.”84 However, these 
protections may be inadequate against all the harms caused by 
featurization. Unless notice is displayed prominently and consent is 
obtained in a way that is meaningful, it is unclear whether this notice 
and consent requirement adds anything meaningful to the existing 
                                                 
79 Id. 
80 Privacy Framework Comparisons, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., 3 
(Dec. 2018), https://cdt.org/files/2018/12/2018-12-12-CDT-CCPA-GDPR-Chart-
FINAL.pdf. 
81 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100.  
82 Id. § 1798.100(b).  
83 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(t)(ii). 
84 See DATAGUIDANCE, Comparing Privacy Laws: GDPR v. CCPA, FUTURE 
OF PRIVACY FORUM, 5 (2018), https://fpf.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/11/GDPR_CCPA_Comparison-Guide.pdf.  
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privacy framework.85 Moreover, companies may choose to only 
afford certain rights—like the opt-in mechanism—to California 
residents, which they are legally entitled to do under the law.86 In 
addition, the CCPA excludes aggregate and deidentified data, as 
well as processing done on data that is “publicly available,” which 
may undercut some of the protections it affords.87 
  
D.  General Data Protection Regulation 
 
The GDPR grants certain affirmative privacy rights to 
individuals and is similar to the CCPA in several respects. The 
GDPR provides  data access rights like the CCPA, and it also 
imposes strict purpose limitations and data minimization 
requirements on data controllers and processors.88 Under the GDPR, 
data may only be collected for a specified purpose and cannot be 
“further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those 
purposes.”89 This purpose specification analysis must be done via 
case-by-case analysis to determine whether further processing is 
compatible by examining, among other things, the context of the 
data collection, the relationship between the purposes for data 
collection and the purposes for further processing, the nature of the 
data, and the impact further processing may have on the data 
subjects.90  Moreover, personal data cannot be stored for longer than 
“is necessary for the purposes for which the personal data are 
processed.”91 In addition, the Article 29 Working Party, a recently 
decommissioned European data protection advisory board, clarified 
that these purposes must achieve a certain level of specificity, and 
that information related to privacy should be delivered in a multi-
                                                 
85 See, e.g., SOLON BAROCAS & HELEN NISSENBAUM, ON NOTICE: THE 
TROUBLE WITH NOTICE AND CONSENT (2009), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2567409.  
86 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(g) (“‘Consumer’ means a natural person 
who is a California resident, as defined in . . . the California Code of 
Regulations[.]”) 
87 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.145(a)(5). 
88 GDPR art. 24-43. 
89 GDPR, art. 5. 
90 DATAGUIDANCE supra note 84. 
91 GDPR, art. 5(1)(b).  
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layered notice to consumers to ensure they are accessible and easily 
readable.92 
Although these provisions appear to offer some meaningful 
protections, the nature of featurization may still subvert them—
particularly in instances where adverse uses are enumerated in the 
Terms of Service from the product’s inception, and the benefits that 
the data can provide require that it be stored for a long period of 
time. Returning to the genetic-testing kit example, individuals may 
want their DNA data to be stored for continued access; or, they may 
have granted research rights to these companies, thus enabling the 
companies to keep data for several years in order to serve that 
purpose. However, throughout that time, the company could still use 
that data and engage in practices that are adverse to the individual’s 
interest if that type of use was included in the fine print.93  
It is also worth noting that the GDPR has only recently been 
enacted and has only been in effect since May 2018. Accordingly, it 
may take more time before the contours of these provisions become 
clear.  
 
III. CONCERNS UNDER EXISTING LAW 
 
Many of the harms posed by featurized products stem from the 
increase in quantity and sensitivity of the information they are able 
to elicit from consumers. These products, and the value they purport 
to offer, make consumers more willing to input and interact with 
their data in ways that are more revealing than ever before. It is this 
willingness to increase one’s data trail, for particularly sensitive 
information, from which additional harms flow. Existing law is ill-
equipped to address the issues that featurization presents. The 
patchwork of laws that govern privacy in the United States 
                                                 
92 Council Directive 95/46/EC, art. 29, Data Protection Working Party (Nov. 
2017), at 6-8. 
93 See, e.g., Erin Brodwin, DNA Testing Company 23andMe has Signed a 
$300 Million Deal with a Drug Giant — Here’s How to Delete Your Data if that 
Freaks You Out, BUS. INSIDER (July 25, 2018), 
https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/dna-testing-delete-your-data-
23andme-ancestry-2018-7-1027400770; Piotr Foitzik, How to Apply the GDPR 
Data Minimization Principle to Online Sales, INT’L ASS’N OF PRIVACY PROF’L.  
(Feb. 26, 2019), https://iapp.org/news/a/how-to-apply-the-gdpr-data-
minimization-principle-to-online-sales/. 
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predominantly follow a notice and consent model, which may be 
insufficient to provide adequate protections in the context of 
featurization—particularly where users are inputting data 
themselves, rather than passively having data collected about them. 
Moreover, most U.S. laws that govern sensitive personal 
information, like health or financial information, would not apply to 
companies that engage in featurization. Other mechanisms for 
enforcement of privacy protections, like the FTC’s Section 5 
authority or industry self-regulation, may also fall short. Similarly, 
California’s new CCPA and Europe’s GDPR offer more affirmative 
privacy protections, but also may not go far enough to protect 
against the types of harms that featurization presents.  
Featurized products elicit sharing of personal information that is 
viewed as intrinsically private. This sharing facilitates new uses for 
data that companies otherwise would not have access to. Most 
people, for instance, probably would not approve of a company 
maintaining a proprietary interest in their DNA and then selling it to 
pharmaceutical companies. Nonetheless, that is exactly how at-
home genetic testing companies like 23andMe operate, and millions 
of users provide them with their data every day.94 The reason, of 
course, is likely that they were interested in learning more about 
their ancestry or health background and found companies whose 
stated purpose was to do exactly that, without considering what 
might happen to their data afterwards.95 
In addition to encouraging data sharing, featurized products may 
increase an individual’s data trail by combining or selling their data 
to third parties. An individual’s data from various accounts can be 
combined in the event of a merger, or a single company may collect 
data on its users in different ways, and subsequently combine them 
to create more holistic profiles of each one.96 Returning to at-home 
genetic testing as an example, consumer genetics companies like 
23andMe have generated a market for at-home DNA testing, 
promising consumers a means to discover information about their 
                                                 
94 Drabiak, supra note 10, at 147 (81.5% of consumers further stated they 
would get genomic testing done if they could afford to). 
95 See, e.g., Opsahl, supra note 53.  
96 See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 18. 
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heritage, health, and traits.97 While the marketing suggests these 
companies are targeted towards the direct-to-consumer market and 
create products solely for the purpose of allowing individuals to 
discover more about themselves, the truth is that 23andMe’s 
intended market was never just consumers.98 Rather, genomics 
companies have collected a significant amount of information, 
which “makes them appealing to a number of additional parties, 
including data brokers, the pharmaceutical industry, employers, 
health insurers, and law enforcement.”99 
In both instances, a user’s data profile is expanded in ways that 
were likely unforeseeable to them and could then be used for 
purposes that are adverse to their interests, or make them even more 
vulnerable in the event of a data breach.100 This increase in an 
individual’s data trail, coupled with an absence of clear regulation 
addressing featurization, has led to three main harms: (1) increased 
vulnerability to data breaches, (2) the expansion in scope of 
permissible surveillance by law enforcement, and (3) discrimination 
resulting in economic loss. It is worth noting that these harms are 
also much more likely to be felt acutely by marginalized 
communities, particularly low-income communities and 
communities of color.  
 
A.  Increased Vulnerability to Data Breaches 
 
An increased data trail combined with additional data sharing 
makes individuals vulnerable to data breaches, simply because their 
data exists in more places, and in more sensitive and revealing 
ways.101 As consumers come to rely on featurized products for 
                                                 
97 23ANDME supra note 3. 
98 Molteni, supra note 7. 
99 Drabiak, supra note 10, at 149. 
100 Max Eddy, Turning a Nest Smart Thermostat into a Data-Stealing Spy in 
15 Seconds, PC MAG: SECURITYWATCH (Aug. 7, 2014), 
https://securitywatch.pcmag.com/hacking/326209-turning-a-nest-smart-
thermostat-into-a-data-stealing-spy-in-15-seconds.  
101 See, e.g., Daniel Zwerdling & G.W. Schulz, Your Digital Trail, and How 
It Can Be Used Against You, NPR (Sept. 30, 2013), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2013/09/30/226835934/your-
digital-trail-and-how-it-can-be-used-against-you. 
25
Lalji: Featurization and the Myth of Data Empowerment
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2019
26 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 15:1 
multiple purposes and across various industries, it likely increases 
their “attack surface”—that is, the number of potential avenues for 
their sensitive information to be exposed or exploited.102 This is 
particularly true as individuals use these types of products across 
several different sectors without assessing the compound effects this 
might have on the protection of their data overall.   
Moreover, it makes individuals vulnerable to more harmful 
types of data breaches. Nest data, for example, would be able to tell 
adversaries when an individual is out of the home or on vacation—
information that could be used “for future digital attacks, or simply 
for burglary.”103 DNA data is also enticing to potential hackers 
because of its uniquely identifying nature. In several recent 
instances hackers broke into DNA databases and held sensitive 
personal data for ransom.104 Hackers could also sell this information 
to data brokers or other interested parties who could then use that 
information to discriminate against or target individuals in a variety 
of contexts.105 While these concerns are in a far-off and perhaps 
uncertain future, they still highlight how certain types of data can be 
much more harmful if leaked. As some experts have pointed out, 
you can change your credit card number, but you can never change 
your DNA.106   
While no data is guaranteed to be secure, existing laws are not 
yet sufficient to ensure this data is required to be kept as 
cryptographically safe as possible. There have been numerous 
instances of featurized products containing easily exploitable 
                                                 
102 See Tim Woods, 5 Ways to Reduce Your Attack Surface, SECURITY 
MAGAZINE (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/89283-
ways-to-reduce-your-attack-surface; Lily Hay Newman, Hacker Lexicon: What 
Is an Attack Surface, WIRED (Mar. 12, 2017), 
https://www.wired.com/2017/03/hacker-lexicon-attack-surface/.  
103 Eddy, supra note 100. 
104 See Zeljka Zorz, US Hospital Paid $55,000 Ransom to Hackers Despite 
Having Backups, HELPNET SECURITY (Jan. 17, 2018), 
https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2018/01/17/hospital-ransomware/; Angela 
Chen, Why a DNA Data Breach is Much Worse than a Credit Card Leak, THE 
VERGE (June 6, 2018), 
https://www.theverge.com/2018/6/6/17435166/myheritage-dna-breach-genetic-
privacy-bioethics.  
105 Chen, supra note 104. 
106 Id. 
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glitches, or even times when that data was actually hacked.107  
Because the companies that create many of these featurized products 
are not required to comply with strict regulations, it is up to these 
companies themselves to maintain stringent enough standards to 
prevent data breaches.108 This has often not worked out.109 It was 
recently reported, for example, that a fertility planner app contained 
a glitch that would have allowed “someone with no hacking skills at 
all” to access highly sensitive information about the women who use 
the app.110 While these apps do not necessarily present an above 
average risk of data breach compared to others on the market, it is 
the sensitivity of the information they collect that makes data 
breaches of this kind to be a particularly serious harm. In the case of 
fertility apps, these companies collect several strands of sensitive 
information, including the user’s history of abortions, moods, 
medications, and smoking or drinking habits.111 But, because 
sectoral privacy laws like HIPAA do not apply to these types of 
companies, they have no heightened incentive to protect this 
information. 
 
B.  Expanding the Scope of Permissible Surveillance 
 
Featurization vastly expands the types of information accessible 
to law enforcement without a warrant. Traditional privacy 
protections granted under the Fourth Amendment do not apply to 
information voluntarily shared with third parties.112  Because 
                                                 
107 See, e.g., GRANT HERNANDEZ ET AL. SMART NEST THERMOSTAT: A 
SMART SPY IN YOUR HOME (2014), https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-
14/materials/us-14-Jin-Smart-Nest-Thermostat-A-Smart-Spy-In-Your-Home-
WP.pdf; Zach Whittaker, DNA Testing Startup Veritas Genetics Confirms Data 
Breach, TechCrunch (Nov. 7, 2019), https://techcrunch.com/2019/11/07/veritas-
genetics-data-breach/; Jerry Beilinson, Glow Pregnancy App Exposed Women to 
Privacy Threats, Consumer Reports Finds, CONSUMER REPORTS (July 28, 2016), 
https://www.consumerreports.org/mobile-security-software/glow-pregnancy-
app-exposed-women-to-privacy-threats/.  
108 See, e.g., Beilinson, supra note 107. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Burke, supra note 8; Beilinson, supra note 107. 
112 The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Carpenter v. United States 
complicates the third party doctrine slightly by introducing additional analysis 
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featurized products are predicated on individuals intentionally 
providing what is often highly sensitive and personal information, it 
could mean they are inadvertently enabling law enforcement to 
access this information.  
There are considerable risks associated with DNA data. The 
popularity of at-home genetic testing has created databases 
containing millions of people’s DNA, which law enforcement has 
already accessed without a warrant and likely will continue to do.113 
Moreover, when individuals submit their DNA to a company, their 
family members are at risk of identification too. Through a process 
called familial matching, police are able to compare DNA from a 
crime scene to DNA in databases to search for partial matches, 
which potentially indicates the suspect is a relative of the match.114 
In a recent high-profile case, police were finally able to catch Joseph 
James DeAngelo, the Golden State Killer, in 2018 by creating a fake 
profile on GEDMatch, a public DNA database and uploading DNA 
collected from previous crime scenes to search for a matches.115 
They were able to identify DeAngelo after their sample matched the 
DNA of DeAngelo’s relatives, who were on the site.116  
                                                 
that may be factored in. However, currently, it is unclear how this will play out in 
contexts beyond the one at issue in that case (CSLI data). See Carpenter v. United 
States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018) (“In light of the deeply revealing nature of 
CSLI, its depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach, and the inescapable and 
automatic nature of its collection, the fact that such information is gathered by a 
third party does not make it any less deserving of Fourth Amendment 
protection.”); see also, Paul Ohm, The Many Revolutions of Carpenter, 32 HARV.  
J.L. & TECH. 352, 361-66 (2019). 
113 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Announces 
Interim Policy on Emerging Methods to Generate Leads for Unsolved Violent 
Crimes (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-
announces-interim-policy-emerging-method-generate-leads-unsolved-violent;  
Megan Molteni, The Future of Crime-Fighting is Family Tree Forensics, WIRED 
(Dec. 26, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/the-future-of-crime-fighting-is-
family-tree-forensics/. 
114 See Molteni, supra note 113.  
115 See Rachel Becker, Golden State Killer Suspect was Tracked Through 
Geneology Website GEDMatch, THE VERGE (Apr. 26, 2018), 
https://www.theverge.com/2018/4/26/17288532/golden-state-killer-east-area-
rapist-genealogy-websites-dna-genetic-investigation. 
116 Id. 
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DNA is not the only type of sensitive information that law 
enforcement may now have greater access to. Law enforcement has 
already requested data from wearables, like a Fitbit, to assist in 
ongoing investigations and could foreseeably demand biometric 
data or other sensitive information be shared with them as well.117 
In instances where law enforcement may access an entire database 
of information at a time, it could enable systems of mass 
surveillance that are ripe for abuse.118 Under existing law, there are 
few protections to protect against this kind of expansion in law 
enforcement’s power.119  
 
C.  Discrimination and Economic Loss 
 
Use of featurized products may also lead to discrimination 
against and economic loss for certain individuals. Insurance 
companies, employers, and other third parties who may access this 
data could use it to perform predictive analytics in ways that 
discriminate against certain individuals, or otherwise cause harm. 
For example, DNA sequencing may one day be used to predict 
individuals’ “susceptibility to adverse health conditions and 
development of disease.”120 Insurance companies may increase their 
premiums for individuals who are genetically more likely to acquire 
a certain disease. Loan companies may deny loans if data predicts 
that a potential borrower could get a disease and die before they can 
                                                 
117 See, e.g., Christine Hauser, Police Use Fitbit Data to Charge 90-Year-Old 
Man in Stepdaughter’s Killing, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/03/us/fitbit-murder-arrest.html; Amanda 
Watts, Cops Use Murdered Woman’s Fitbit to Charge her Husband, CNN (Apr. 
26, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/04/25/us/fitbit-womans-death-
investigation-trnd/index.html; Jay Stanley, Local Police Using and Abusing DNA 
and Other Biometric Technologies, ACLU (Sept. 13, 2016), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/local-
police-using-and-abusing-dna-and-other.  
118 Bryson Masse, What’s the Worst that Could Happen with Huge Databases 
of Biometric Data?, GIZMODO (Sept. 11, 2017), https://gizmodo.com/what-s-the-
worst-that-could-happen-with-huge-databases-1802696698.  
119 See Tom Simonite, Few Rules Govern Police Use of Facial-Recognition 
Technology, WIRED (May 22, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/few-rules-
govern-police-use-of-facial-recognition-technology/.  
120 Drabiak, supra note 10, at 146. 
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pay their debt back. Credit scoring companies, too, may be 
repurposing this type of data in ways that may cause future financial 
harms to consumers.121 
In addition, while the majority of featurized products in use 
currently are obtained in a personal capacity for personal use, the 
companies that create these products are increasingly partnering 
with employers and insurance companies in order to create 
mechanisms for monitoring employees or subscribers.122 The 
pregnancy and menstrual tracker Ovia, for example, recently came 
under fire for partnering with employers and sharing data with 
employers relating to their employees in an aggregate format.123 In 
the case of Ovia, employees must opt in before their data can be 
shared with employers, even in aggregate format.124 However, many 
are concerned that these companies are targeting individuals who 
are in an incredibly vulnerable position, and consumers may not 
realize exactly what they are giving away.125 In addition, employers 
may entice their employees to provide this information through 
monetary incentives or other rewards. Activision Blizzard, for 
example, offered its female employees one dollar a day to opt into 
the employer version of Ovia.126 As one woman put it, “that’s 
money for diapers and bottles.”127 But, without more limitations on 
the collection and use of this data, employers may be able to use this 
information in largely invisible ways that are harmful to their 
employees. Although existing discrimination laws protect against 
wrongful terminations on the basis of pregnancy, for example, that 
                                                 
121 Tatiana Dias & Igor Natusch, They Are Stalking You to Calculate Your 
Credit Score, CHUPADADOS, https://chupadados.codingrights.org/en/they-are-
stalking-you-to-calculate-your-score/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2019). 
122 See, e.g., Drew Harwell, Is Your Pregnancy App Sharing Your Intimate 
Data with Your Boss?, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/04/10/tracking-your-
pregnancy-an-app-may-be-more-public-than-you-
think/?utm_term=.ff0399d9ca1c.  
123 Id.  
124 Ovia Health Privacy Policy, OVIA, https://www.ovuline.com/dynamic-
privacy (last visited Apr. 9, 2019).  
125  Harwell, supra note 122. 
126 Id.   
127 Id. 
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alone may not be sufficient to deter the wrongful conduct of all 
potentially implicated employers.  
Finally, in the adverse data-sharing context, data may be sold to 
data brokers or other for-profit third parties. This can lead to a 
number of subsequent issues, including placing people in high-risk 
classifications, and marketing to them in predatory ways.128 These 
companies can already tell “if you’ve just gone through a break-up, 
if you’re pregnant or trying to lose weight, whether you’re an 
extrovert, what medicine you take, where you’ve been, and even 
how you swipe and tap on your phone.”129 Combining this 
information with featurized product data may allow data brokers to 
infer even more about individuals, including highly sensitive 
information.  
 
D.  Impact on Vulnerable Communities 
 
These harms may be most acutely felt by vulnerable populations, 
such as low-income communities. Individuals with fewer resources 
may increasingly rely on these products to fill in areas of life that 
are otherwise unaffordable.130 Because many featurized products, 
like diagnostic medical apps or AI-enhanced financial assistant 
apps, offer services that would otherwise be expensive, it is more 
likely that these communities would come to rely on them more. 
These vulnerable populations may use featurized apps as substitutes 
for doctors or other established institutions. Thus, the risks posed 
are enhanced for these populations, particularly in these instances.131  
Because federal regulations have yet to catch up to some of these 
technologies, the consequences for these individuals could be 
severe. For example, featurized applications are not legally required 
                                                 
128 Yael Grauer, What Are ‘Data Brokers,’ and Why Are They Scooping Up 
Information About You?, VICE (Mar. 27, 2018), 
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/bjpx3w/what-are-data-brokers-and-
how-to-stop-my-private-data-collection. 
129 Steven Melendez & Alex Pasternack, Here Are the Data Brokers Quietly 
Buying and Selling Your Personal Information, FAST COMPANY (Mar. 2, 2019), 
https://www.fastcompany.com/90310803/here-are-the-data-brokers-quietly-
buying-and-selling-your-personal-information.  
130 See, e.g., CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECHNOLOGY supra note 25. 
131 Id.  
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to be accurate.132 Pregnancy tracker apps have recently come under 
fire for being inaccurate,133 and, diagnostic apps, although they may 
caveat that they are not a substitute for medical professionals, could 
also incorrectly diagnose individuals in ways that deter them from 
getting medical treatment or cause them to seek the wrong type of 
treatment.134  This is especially true considering that artificial 
intelligence enhanced applications are already notorious for their 
bias against people of color and women.135  
 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
A.  Create Statutory Limitations on the Third-Party Doctrine 
 
Federal law needs to evolve to protect featurized data above the 
Fourth Amendment baseline. Although the Supreme Court in 
Carpenter held that the Fourth Amendment protects private cell-
phone location data from warrantless searches, as of now, it is 
unclear whether that analysis would apply to featurization.136  
Crafting a warrant requirement for highly personal and sensitive 
information like the DNA or biometric identifiers held in either 
public or private databases would help ensure that this information 
is not used adversely for law enforcement purposes. Some states 
have already enacted laws for these purposes. For example, 
California requires law enforcement to obtain a warrant before 
gaining access to data from digital voice assistants.137 However, 
                                                 
132 Although inaccuracy could incur an unfair and deceptive act and practices 
claim by the FTC, this may not be sufficient to deter the practice universally. 
133 Alexandra Sifferlin, Why Your Period Tracker is Wrong, TIME (June 8, 
2016), http://time.com/4361855/period-tracker-fertility-tracker-app/.  
134 CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECHNOLOGY, supra note 25.  
135 Joy Buolamwini, Artificial Intelligence Has a Problem with Gender and 
Racial Bias. Here’s How to Solve It, TIME (Feb. 7, 2019), 
http://time.com/5520558/artificial-intelligence-racial-gender-bias/.  
136 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018).  
137 See Geoffrey A. Fowler, Alexa Has Been Eavesdropping on You this 
Whole Time, WASH. POST (May 6, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/pb/technology/2019/05/06/alexa-has-been-
eavesdropping-you-this-whole-
time/?nid=menu_nav_accessibilityforscreenreader&outputType=accessibility&u
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merely requiring a warrant for this type of data is not sufficient to 
protect users’ personal information. Those on the receiving end must 
also challenge overbroad warrants or those that are not sufficiently 
particularized.138  
 
B.  Increase Oversight into Products in Sensitive Industries 
 
Federal law must adapt to the rise of featurization and provide 
greater protections for the information collected by these products, 
particularly in sensitive areas like health and finance. This can be 
accomplished in several ways, including amending sectoral privacy 
laws like HIPAA and the GLBA to cover these types of products, or 
crafting new laws specifically targeting featurization. Regardless, 
these laws must include provisions to ensure security, accuracy, and 
fairness.  
 
1. Security 
 
Under existing law, there is only a patchwork of security 
requirements for individuals’ data. HIPAA, for example, includes 
an affirmative cybersecurity requirement for personal information 
held by covered entities, and, currently, the FTC is in the notice-
and-comment phase of amending the GLBA to include more 
detailed and stringent security measures regarding financial 
information.139 These two laws, however, would likely not apply to 
the majority of featurized products in the health and finance spaces. 
The FTC’s Section 5 authority governs cybersecurity requirements 
for most other players in industry. However, under the FTC’s unfair 
and deceptive practice enforcement alone, it is difficult to ensure 
that all companies are maintaining sufficient cybersecurity 
                                                 
138 See, e.g., Cassie Martin, Why a Warrant to Search GEDMatch’s Genetic 
Data Has Sparked Privacy Concerns, SCIENCENEWS (Nov. 12, 2019), 
sciencenews.org/article/why-warrant-search-gedmatch-genetic-data-has-
sparked-privacy-concerns; How to Challenge Digital Device Searches, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/criminaldefender/digital-
device-searches/how-to-challenge#lack_of_specificity. (last accessed Apr. 27, 
2019). 
139 P.L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1938 (1996); 16 U.S.C. § 6803(f). 
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standards, and, moreover, to identify those who are not, before 
individuals’ data is compromised.  
A federal law that creates a safe harbor or certification for 
companies that voluntarily enact more stringent cybersecurity 
requirements, similar to the Cyber Shield Bill that Senator Markey 
introduced in 2017, could provide the requisite incentive to ensure 
individuals’ data is safer, without being overly-burdensome to small 
companies who may find compliance too onerous.140 If that 
certification were displayed prominently, users would be able to 
make better-informed choices about each product they use.  
 
2. Fairness 
 
Featurized data in the health and finance sectors must be guarded 
from misuse. Accordingly, the law should prohibit this data from 
being used in ways that are adverse to the individuals’ interest. For 
example, federal law should unilaterally prohibit featurized data—
like DNA data collected through at-home genetic testing kits—from 
being sold to insurance companies or employers unless 
pseudonymized in a way that prohibits re-identification of specific 
consumers. Moreover, in instances where the data would be sold to 
third parties without aggregation or pseudonymization, the company 
must acquire the individuals’ express consent.  
 
3. Accuracy 
 
Featurized products must also be regulated for accuracy, 
particularly when they may act as a substitute for in-person services, 
such as financial assistance or diagnostic medical applications. 
Moreover, because these types of products may impact vulnerable 
populations more severely, any new federal law should be required 
to conduct impact assessments on how, in particular, they perform 
within regard to vulnerable populations. 
  
                                                 
140 Cyber Shield Act of 2017, S. 2020, 115th Cong. § 1 (2017). 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Featurization can benefit consumers by promoting greater 
awareness of health, finance, and energy habits. However, the data 
collected by this process is ripe for abuse—both by law enforcement 
and by private companies. The companies that collect this data can 
not only gather both a greater amount and more sensitive 
information about individuals, but also profit off of this practice in 
ways that pose significant privacy risks to users. There must be 
stronger privacy protections enacted in order to protect against these 
risks while still preserving the benefits that featurization can 
provide. 
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